Kamilla Timerbulatova

Abstract

My primary research interests include (but are not limited to) application of game-theoretic methods to marketing and management, specifically, hiring process, taking into account the presence of social media. Current research develops a game-theoretic model of mutual signaling in the labor market via social media, extending Spence's classic job market signaling theory. Unlike traditional models where only employees signal, this framework incorporates two-sided private information and two-way communication. Firms possess private information about non-contractible job characteristics ("firm quality"), while workers have private information about their productivity ("talent"). The sequential game begins with the firm signaling its type by investing in social media promotion. Workers then respond by choosing a combination of two signals: traditional educational investment and a social signal (e.g., demonstrating social connections). The social signal is assumed to be cheaper than the educational one, and cost functions satisfy the Spence-Mirrlees single-crossing condition. The analysis focuses on separating equilibria with minimal distortion relative to first-best contracts. The study aims to understand how investments in maintaining favorable images on social media affect equilibrium characteristics and overall social welfare in the environment of multidirectional signaling.