Iannis Reuter

Abstract

This research project examines whether nudges can promote water conservation in collective housing and whether any effect they produce is driven primarily by the visibility of individual benefits or can also stem from collective coordination. In collective housing, water consumption is often partly pooled, metering is not always individualized, and the link between individual behavior and the water bill may therefore remain blurred, which can weaken the effectiveness of conventional price-based instruments. Drawing on water economics, commons theory, and behavioral economics, the project studies the impact of a local social-comparison message on water consumption in individually metered and collectively metered buildings. Empirically, it relies on consumption data provided by Iléo in the European Metropolis of Lille (MEL) and proposes a field experiment combined with a difference-in-differences strategy. Beyond evaluating the effect of an informational intervention, the project seeks to identify whether water conservation in collective housing is driven mainly by individual incentives or can also be sustained by a logic of the commons.