At a time when democratic systems are facing growing internal and external pressures, one of the central questions for contemporary public law is whether—and how—competition law can contribute to safeguarding the democratic legal order. This question concerns both the substantive content of competition law and the institutional and procedural framework of its enforcement. This lecture explores the relationship between competition law and democracy along two complementary dimensions: substantive and procedural. The substantive dimension focuses, first, on the role of competition law in constraining the exercise of private market power in sectors where economic and political power intersect. Second, it examines how competition law may help ensure that private actors—particularly digital platforms and media companies—provide consumers as citizens with access to diverse and plural sources of information, a precondition for democratic discourse. Third, the lecture considers the potential role of competition law in addressing broader socio-economic and environmental values, and the tensions this may generate. The procedural dimension centres on the rule of law as a foundational democratic value. Here, the lecture analyses how the institutional design and procedural safeguards of competition law enforcement should protect the independence and integrity of competition authorities and courts, shielding them from political pressure and capture by private interests. Building on this analytical framework, the lecture then turns to the contemporary political risks facing competition law, particularly in the context of the rise of authoritarian (illiberal) politics. Such political movements challenge the core principles of constitutional democracy and often involve the arbitrary use of state economic power, thereby undermining rule-of-law-based competition enforcement. The lecture introduces the concept of an “illiberal blueprint” to identify patterns of impermissible politicisation and to help recognise when critical red lines have been crossed. These patterns include, among others: interference in competition authorities’ decision-making, erosion of institutional independence, attrition of senior staff, restrictions on enforcement powers, politically motivated or selective enforcement, self-restraint in cases involving politically connected firms, and political pressure exerted on courts and judges. Overall, the lecture offers students both a conceptual framework and diagnostic tools to understand the pro-democratic potential of competition law as well as the conditions under which that potential is at risk.