(Tuesday, 1st January 2002)
A perceived change in the organizational focus of agriculture has given rise to the increased use of the term industrialization. Essentially, this change is viewed as a movement from a homogeneous commodity system to one emphasizing product differentiation and quality improvement. Movement toward increased product quality is associated with greater contracts and vertical integration. Often drawing contrasts between the "old" agriculture and the "new", the industrialization literature is largely descriptive. Rather than developing explicit testable hypotheses, the literature discusses outcomes informally and links them with possible motivation factors using frameworks drawn from management. Explicit linkages are left undeveloped, and in their place are a number of implicit hypotheses regarding the relationships among contract choice, quality and other changes in agriculture. The lecture will present a survey to focus on what is new in vertical coordination analysis.
Bibliographical references :
Hennessy D [1996], "Information asymmetry as a reason for food industry vertical integration", American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 78, 1034-43.
Tsoulouhas, T. and Vukina, T. [1999], "Integrator Contracts with many Agents and Bankruptcy", American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 81 (1), 61-74.
Goodhue, R. [1999], "Input Control in Agricultural Production Contracts", American Journal of Agricultural Economics", 81, 616-620.
Goodhue, R. [2000], "Broiler Production Contracts as a Multi-Agent Problem :Incentives, Common Risk and Hetrogeneity", American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 82, 606-622.