(Tuesday, 1st January 2002)
Game Theory applied to relational contracts and institutions" This workshop aims to illustrate how game theory can contribute to better understand institutions and "relational contracts" (Gibbons, 2001). It will focus on repeated games that have been broadly used to explain the emergence of institutions. This theoretic framework highlights the role of commitment, reputation and self-enforcement in repeated relationships. Applications to guilds in the medieval Europe (Greif, Milgrom and Weingast 1994), to Maghribi traders (Greif, 1993), to franchising and to tacit collusion will be presented.
Bibliographical references :
Gibbons, R, (2001), "Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm" , ith G. Baker and K. J. Murphy. W Forthcoming in Quarterly Journal of Economics.
Gibbons, R (2000), "Trust in Social Structures: Hobbes and Coase Meet Repeated Games", Forthcoming in K. Cook (ed.), Trust in Society, New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Greif , Avner, Milgrom Paul, and Weingast Barry (1994) "Coordination, Commitment and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Gild" Journal of Political Economy, vol. 102, No. 4, pp.745-76.
Greif , Avner (1993) "Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders' Coalition." American Economic Review, 83(3), June, pp. 525-48.
