The workshop will address the evolution of main approaches in competition law and economics both in US and UE.
The talk will in particular outline the contribution of New Institutional Economics to Antitrust policy stressing how the perspective of transaction costs economics has rapidly reversed some of the main conclusions of ‘Sherman Act’ Antitrust. The success of New Institutional Economics in dealing with antitrust issues has been recently challenged by post-Chicago scholars’ contributions aimed at emphasizing the interdependence between internal efficiency in organizations and market monopolization. Some antitrust cases are discussed and a possible agenda for future research is proposed.

Lecture Outline:

1. Antitrust Law and Economics: the origins
2. The core of Chicago Law and Economics
3. New Institutional Economics meets Antitrust Law and Economics
4. Antitrust vs Regulation
5. Post-Chicago Antitrust
6. Some paradoxes and dilemmas