Bruno Deffains
U. of Paris Ouest Nanterre la Défense

Deffains

(Thursday, 4th April 2002)

Title : Efficiency of civil law

Bibliographical references :

Efficiency of civil law

Deffains

(Wednesday, 2nd April 2003)

Title : Efficiency of civil law

Bibliographical references :

Must read reference : Papier de présentation / Presentation paper

Deffains

(Friday, 25th May 2007)

Title : Legal Versus Normative Incentives

The presentation analyzes the complementarity between legal incentives (the threat of being held liable for damages) and normative incentives (the fear of social disapproval or stigma) in situations where instances of misbehavior are not perfectly observable. There may be multiple equilibria within a given legal regime, as well as multiple socio-legal equilibria. In particular, there are high stigma-high evidentiary standard regimes versus low stigma-low stan- dard ones. This may explain some of the diferences between common law and civil law regarding the notions of fault or negligence. The analysis may provide an explanation for trends currently observed in civil law systems, in particular the weakening of evidentiary requirements in tort cases.
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