Jean-Michel Glachant
U. of Paris XI



(Tuesday, 1st January 2002)

Title : Governance and Regulation of Network Industries

Network industries liberalization belongs to the core of public policies of European States and the European Commission since the 80s. However, on the one hand, 'markets' didn't become the sole regulator of these industries in Europe. On the other hand, there is no 'single Utilities market' in Europe nor any 'single European Utilities regulation'. New institutional analysis help understanding why 'governance' matters in this issue.

Bibliographical references :

European Commission DG TREN report on electricity liberalisation (2001).

Glachant J.-M. (2002-a), "Why regulate deregulated network industries?," submited to the Journal of Network Industries.

Glachant J.-M. (2002-b), "Comparing institutional foundations: the creation of competitive wholesale markets in Europe," in B. Deffains (ed), Proceedings of Law and Economics in Civil Law Countries, ed. Cujas (forthcoming).

Glachant J.-M. (2002-c), "The making of competitive electricity markets in Europe," in J.-M. Glachant & D. Finon (eds), Competition in European Electricity Markets: A Cross Country Comparison, Edward Elgar, chapter 1.

Levy, B. and P. T. Spiller (1994). "The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, vol. 10, no.2, pp. 201-246.

Eberlein B. (2000), "Configurations of Economic Regulation in the European Union: The Case of Electricity in Comparative Perspective," Current Politics and Economics of Europe, Special Issue (Regulation in Europe, edited by David Coen and Mark Thatcher), vol. 9, no. 4, pp. 407-425.

Glachant J.-M. and Finon D. (2000), "Why do the European Union's electricity industries continue to differ? A new institutional analysis," in C. Menard (ed.), Institutions, Contracts and Organizations, Edward Elgar, pp. 313-334.

Holburn G; & Spiller P. (2002), "Institutional or Structural: Lessons from International Electricity Sector Reforms," in E. Brousseau and J.-M. Glachant (eds), The Economics of Contracts: Theories and Applications, Cambridge University Press, chapter 26.

Dang N'Guyen G. and Penard T. (2002), "Interconnection agreements: strategic behaviour and property rights," in E. Brousseau & J.-M. Glachant (eds), The Economics of Contracts: Theories and Applications, Cambridge University Press, chapter 21.



(Wednesday, 1st January 2003)

Title : Institutional Reform and Deregulation

The aim of this workshop is to introduce to the institutional analysis of actual deregulation policies. It doesn’t matter so much who is pushing for deregulation: the World Bank or the European Commission? What matters is the institutional framework in which such reforms are made. Here the "Institutional Complementarity" condition applies: a reform is only an ex ante promise until the existing institutional environment could implement it in its entirety.

Bibliographical references :

Must read reference : Jean-Michel Glachant [2002], "Why regulate deregulated network industries?", Journal of Network Industries, Vol 3: 297-311.

D. Finon [2002], "Introducing Competition in the French Electricity Supply Industry: the destabilisation of a public hierarchy in an open institutional environment", CEEPR Working Paper N°2002-09 (MIT)
available on the CEEPR website,

P. Joskow [2002], "Transaction Costs, Antitrust rules and remedies", Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, April.

L. Haggarty & M.M Shirley [2002], "The Structure of Effective Regulatory Governance: Evidence from Telecommunications", Working Paper World Bank.

CNRS Chaire GovReg Europe