Ricard Gil
U.C. Santa Cruz



(Thursday, 19th May 2011)

Title : Economics of Relational and Informal Contracts

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This workshop will divide into two parts. On the first half, I will present briefly the economics of relational contracting, that is, the incidence and relevance of informal contracting in our economy. On the second half, I will introduce the different empirical methodologies that researchers have used to test for the impact and presence of relational contracting.

Paper of reference

Gil, R. and Marion, J. (2009) "The Role of Repeated Interactions, Informal Agreements and Relational [Sub]Contracting: Evidence from California Highway Procurement Auctions".

Other papers to be discussed

Kirabo Jackson and Henry Schneider. 2010. "Do Social Connections Reduce Moral Hazard? Evidence from the New York City Taxi Industry," manuscript.

Gil, R. (2009) "The Interplay of Formal and Relational Contracts: Evidence from Movies," SSRN Working Paper # 1425833.

Macchiavello, Rocco and Ameet Morjaria. 2010. The Value of Relational Contracts: Evidence from a Supply Shock to Kenya Flower Exports.

CNRS Chaire GovReg Europe