(Thursday, 24th May 2012)
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Many bargaining settings involve a buyer dealing with different sellers of complementary or substitute goods. The outcomes of these so-called one-to-many negotiations are likely to be affected by the information flow between them as well as by their sequence. This lecture will briefly review the fast-growing literature. In light of Krasteva and Yildirim (2012), it will demonstrate the buyer’s desire for confidential negotiations. The lecture will show an endemic indifference to sequencing, and then consider extensions in which the buyer may have a strict preference for the sequence depending on sellers’ characteristics. Several policies such as mandatory disclosure laws and consumer rights extending contract deadlines will also be discussed.
Bibliographical references :
Krasteva, Silvana, and Huseyin Yildirim. (2012) “On the Role of Confidentiality and Deadlines in Bilateral Negotiations.” Games and Economic Behavior, Forthcoming
Krasteva, Silvana, and Huseyin Yildirim. (2012) “Payoff Uncertainty, Bargaining Power, and the Strategic Sequencing of Bilateral Negotiations.” Duke University Working Paper.
Noe, Thomas, and Jun Wang (2004), “Fooling All of the People Some of the Time: a Theory of Endogenous Sequencing in Confidential negotiations.” Review of Economic Studies, 71, 855-81.