(Thursday, 22nd May 2014)
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By Carlos Pereira, Professor of Political Institutions and Public Policy at Getulio Vargas Foundation – FGV, Rio de Janeiro
In many presidential democracies, the existence of fragmented multiparty systems encourages directly elected executives to share power and other resources via the construction of interparty coalition alliances. This form of governance, now given the name of “coalitional presidentialism,” is notably under theorized. In the comparative literature and in the existing theoretical models, coalitional presidentialism occupies an ill-defined space between classic works on U.S. presidentialism (where unipartisan governments are the norm) and on European parliamentarism (in which multiparty cabinets are routine, but in which is there is no directly elected executive and the functioning of governments is distinct from multiparty presidentialism). Yet empirically, coalitional presidentialism is becoming increasingly common: it is now the modal form of democratic governance in Latin America, and analogous regimes exist in Africa, Asia, and post-communist Europe as well. This workshop will address and discuss coalition tools presidents in multiparty environments may strategically manage in order to build and sustain majority coalitions intertemporally in new democracies.
Bibliographical references :
Must read reference : Raile, Eric D; Pereira, Carlos; and Power, Timothy (2011) “The Executive Toolbox: Building Legislative Support in Multiparty Presidential Regime.” Political Research Quarterly, 64 (2): 323-334.
Chaisty, Paul; Cheeseman, Nic; and Power, Timothy (2014) “Rethinking the Presidentialism Debate: Conceptualizing Coalitional Politics in Cross Regional Perspective” Democratization 21 (1): 72-94.
Pereira, Carlos and Melo, Marcus (2012) “The Unexpected Success of Multiparty Presidential Regimes” Journal of Democracy, 23 (3): 156-170.