(Wednesday, 2nd April 2003)
Bibliographical references :
Must read reference : Libecap G. (2002), "Transaction Costs and Institutional Responses to the Common Pool", Prepared for presentation at the Coase Institute, Cambridge, Massachusetts, September 2002.
Bial J., Houser D. & G. Libecap (2002), "Public choice issues in international collective action: Global warming regulation".
Libecap G. (2003), "Transaction Costs and the Reallocation of Water Rights from Agriculture to Urban and Environmental Uses", working paper, Karl Eller Center, University of Arizona.
(Wednesday, 4th May 2005)
This class is aimed at addressing the economics, law, and politics of the common pool (open access). All environmental and most natural resource problems involve some aspects of the “commons.” Resources may be open-access due to endogenous social regimes—costs, benefits, customary practices, etc, or due to particular geo-physical or biological regimes that raise the costs of controlling access. So the class will be about the explaining the causes and consequences of common pool resources and well as the institutional solutions—keeping open access, customs, private rights, group ownership, state ownership, state regulation.
You will obtain a better understanding of the “Tragedy of the Commons,” how open-access is managed, and why problems of the common pool often are so difficult to solve, despite important economic costs and incentives to resolve them. Management regimes include private ownership, joint ownership, customary control (common property), and administrative agency management. You will examine why and how each of these management arrangements exists and its effectiveness. You will read and discuss the basic theoretical and empirical literature.
In the analytical section of the course we will discuss open access, the tragedy of the commons, private property rights, common property rights, complex rights, state regulation, bargaining issues, externalities and social costs.
In the applications section there are many possibilities: land, minerals, water, wildlife, air, oceans, fisheries, spectrum, pests, and intellectual property.
*paper to be distributed prior to class.
A. Externalities: Session 1
B. The Tragedy of the Commons: Over Entry and Use, Under Investment: Session 2
4. Michael Heller, 1998, “The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets,” Harvard Law Review, 622-88.
D. Solutions: Customs, Common Rights: Session 3
E. Solutions: Private Property Rights: Session 4