(Thursday, 25th May 2017)
Title : Behavioral Regulatory Agencies
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The lecture will address how the commitment problem in regulation, and the potential for a strategic delegation solution, is affected by the consideration of bounded rationality by agents that participate in the regulatory interaction. Regulators and other agents have endogenous preferences. Non-optimizing behavior, expert biases (and related de-biasing strategies), and a concern for fairness and process also modify the traditional regulatory game. As a result, on the one hand independent regulators are seen as part of a potentially more robust regulatory system, and on the other hand their contribution to this system can be based on a wider range of instruments. Potential ideas for future research will be explored.
Bibliographical references :
William E. Kovacic & James C. Cooper, Behavioral Economics: Implications for Regulatory Behavior, 41 J. Reg. Econ. (2012).
Francesc Trillas, Behavioral Regulatory Agencies, mimeo, February 2016.