(Tuesday, 4th May 2004)
Summary of the Presentation: We will start by looking at the public nature of law enforcement. The economic theory of deterrence with monetary and nonmonetary sanctions will be explained in detail. Recent developments and extensions of the theory of deterrence will be addressed. A quick look at other goals of law enforcement such as incapacitation and preference-shaping will complete the first part of the lecture.
In the second part of the lecture, we will consider the general structure of law enforcement and explore the borderline between criminal and tort law. Topics will include the choice of private versus public enforcement, joint use methods of legal intervention, the role of safety regulation, and particular aspects of corporate criminal liability and regulation of financial markets.
The lecture concludes with reflections on comparative aspects of law enforcement, namely the role of legislators and judges, administration of law enforcement, and unification of law enforcement.
Bibliographical references :
S. Shavell (1993) "The Optimal Structure of Law Enforcement", Journal of Law and Economics 36: 255-287.
S. Shavell (2003) "Economic Analysis of the General Structure of the Law", forthcoming in Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law, Harvard University Press. Link: discussion paper 408 at : http://www.law.harvard.edu/[..].
N. Garoupa (1997) "The Theory of Optimal Law Enforcement", Journal of Economic Surveys 11: 267-295.
A. M. Polinsky and S. Shavell (2000) "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law", Journal of Economic Literature 38: 45-76.
N. Garoupa (2004) "An Economic Analysis of Criminal Law", forthcoming in Economic Analysis of Law: A European Perspective, Edward Elgar, edited by Aristides Hatzis.