Jesse Fried
U.C. Berkeley



(Tuesday, 22nd May 2007)

Title : Executive Compensation in Widely-Held US Firms

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Over 70 years ago, Berle and Means described the problems that arise because of the separation of ownership and control in widely-held U.S. companies. These companies are owned by dispersed public shareholders, but controlled by their managers who have substantial discretion under state corporate law.  My lecture will focus on how managers have used their power to obtain pay arrangements that do not serve shareholders’ interests.  I will also discuss and evaluate the various efforts made by shareholders and the federal government to address this problem.

Bibliographical references :

Must read reference : Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried (2003) "Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem", Journal of Economic Perspectives, Volume 17, Number 3, Pages 71–92.

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