(Friday, 4th June 2010)
The main objective of these lectures is to discuss, with the help of some basic models, the interactions of lobbying activities and legislative decision making. Lobbying will be described as a game of influence with the lobbies and the legislators as the players. We will review some of the literature and proceed to a more detailed analysis of a popular game due to Groseclose and Snyder (1996) and further explored by Banks, Diermeier and Myerson. The method will be illustrated with a sample of real worl examples. In the final part, we would like to sort out the lessons learned from this theory to suggest a new approach to power measurement and sketch an application to the case of the EU council of ministers.
Bibliographical references :
Michel Le Breton and Vera Zaporozhets (2010), Voting Power in the EU Council of Ministers and Fair Decision-Making (mimeo)
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Michel Le Breton, Peter Sudhölter and Vera Zaporozhets (2009), Sequential Legislative Lobbying, (mimeo).
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Michel Le Breton and Vera Zaporozhets (2008), Sequential Legislative Lobbying under Political Certainty, working paper version.
Published in The Economic Journal, vol. 120, n°543, 2009, p. 281-312.
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